"...such studies should include studies of plants that are under inoculum pressure by multiple viruses since
such conditions may influence the acquisition of virus by an insect, or make it possible for some insects to
transmit that did not normally transmit in the case of single infection. All such studies should be well
controlled with non-transgenic plants that are similarly treated. The impact of resistance on selection, as well
as the degree of resistance, i.e., near-immune conditions versus highly or moderately resistant plant lines
should be included in studies. It is hoped that studies are not carried out only with members of the
Solanaceae, but also with crops such as corn and soybeans where the pest problems are different and the
acreages of planting likely to be much greater than for horticultural crops.
Furthermore, the contents of alkaloids and other secondary compounds are different with different crops and
may affect insect feeding and transmission of disease agents."
b.
Expert Panel's comments
See Expert Panel comments under objective 3.
7.
Objective #7.
The potential for nontarget effects of introduced plant-defense compounds
expressed in genetically modified plant associated microorganisms (e.g., compounds in
phyllosphere or rhizosphere inhabiting bacteria) or in plants (e.g., Bacillus thuringiensis
delta-endotoxin), especially in regard to persistence of the organisms and material in the
environment.
a.
Reviewers' comments
The general consensus was favorable towards this objective albeit, as one reviewer said, "Perhaps some fine tuning
is in order." Only a few of the reviewers offered specific comments directed towards this Program area:
- "This is clearly stated and well circumscribed... although it appears to assume that persistence of engineered
organisms in the environment is inherently a risk. The use of Bacillus thuringiensis as an example of non-target effects overlooks the widely accepted view that the greatest risk associated with the delta-endotoxin is
that their injudicious use will result in rapid insect resistance and hence loss of an otherwise low-risk strategy
of pest control to higher risk chemical alternatives."
- "Studies regarding the impacts of Bt on the soil ecosystem are desperately needed-- but, the impacts will
depend on soil properties, and therefore, this effort should make sure impacts are evaluated in a wide variety
of soil types."
- "This is a specific, important area for research in the context of risk assessment, and intent is clear."
- "Characterization of non-target pesticidal effects of genetically modified microbes or plants is timely and
appropriate. This is justified by well-documented declines in valued non-target populations following the
widespread adoption of chemical pesticides."
- This same reviewer offered this overview of objectives 4-7: "Taken collectively, research areas 4-7 call for
sophisticated experimental designs quantifying risks associated with narrowly defined impact pathways. This
portion of the Program's call for proposals underlines the notion that knowledge of risk pathways for
genetically modified plants is much more advanced than for other sectors of agricultural biotechnology. In
contrast, risk assessment for genetically modified microbes, arthropods, and aquatic organisms is in an
exploratory stage."
- The following refinements were offered by another reviewer who wrote: "There are persistent and lingering
questions related to the impacts of transgene-derived proteins on non-target organisms in the environment,
including the rhizosphere and soils that contain crop residues, and leaf tissues. One of the most nagging
questions is related to the survival of genes that encode resistance to antibiotics, since such genes are
generally included in transformation/selection protocols. In the selection of grants for funding at least one
should be for the study of survival of gene sequences in animal digestive systems. Although many of us
consider the likelihood of horizontal transfer between organisms to be extremely unlikely (even fantasy) the
public has a concern that has not yet been carefully addressed." The reviewer went on to suggest that, "the
proteins that are selected for study should include those that are likely to be included in crops, including PR
proteins and phytoallexins, as well as proteins that control specific insects and microbes."
b.
Expert Panel's comments
The Expert Panel regarded this as an important objective because of its focus on microbial issues. They concluded
that the question of antibiotic resistance should be given a high priority and suggested that it is so important that the
BRARGP might consider upgrading it to the status of an objective (rather than one issue within objective 7).
8.
Objective #8.
"Identification of genes which can confer additional pathogenicity to animal
pathogens."
a.
Reviewers' comments
Of all the objectives, this one was the focus of some of the more strident comments from the reviewers. As seen in
the comments listed below, the preponderance of the invective is directed at a perceived lack of clarity in the Program
description.
- One reviewer offered this explanation for the lack of specificity of this Program area: "Research area 8,
addressing the possibility that introduced genes could recombine with or otherwise increase the pathogenicity
of animal pathogens, corresponds to the plant-oriented research areas 5 and 6. The broad generality of
research area 8, compared to the specificity of areas 5 and 6, emphasizes how much less we know about the
risk pathways and animal pathogens at issue."
- Another reviewer noted: "It is unclear if genes of the host or the pathogen are of interest. If the former, it
might be clearer to use wording such as 'increased susceptibility to pathogens,' Perhaps an example would
increase clarity."
- Objective #8 was described by one reviewer as "...very concise, to the point that some individuals did not
understand the nature of the area being proposed. If included in subsequent announcements, the nature of
the 'animal pathogens' should be clarified. For example, are insects 'animals?' Or, are some other animals
pathogenic? Or, perhaps the announcement meant pathogens of animals?"
However, the bulk of the commentary on this objective was less magnanimous.
- "It is unclear what types of projects are anticipated to involve genes that can confer additional pathogenicity
to animal pathogens, although certain of those described above might be placed in this category." This
reviewer went on to propose the following revisions to this objective: "It goes without saying that such studies
should involve livestock animals and poultry, etc., rather than rodents and other "model" animals that are not
part of the (U.S.) diet. Other genes that might impact pathogenicity of animal pathogens might include
proteins that affect freezing tolerance, or that encode proteases, toxins and other proteins that might impact
pathogenicity of microorganisms. However, because the likelihood that any gene recombinations or other
types of gene transfer is extremely low (fantasy) it will be important to fund only those proposals that are of
the highest quality by the most suited of research teams. The team must include plant biologists,
microbiologists, animal nutritionists, and population biologists/geneticists, and should be funded for 3-5
years, with good preliminary results available to the research and regulatory agencies within 6-18 months.
If such a project is to be funded, it should be done correctly so that the results will leave few doubts of their
significance and applicability to biotechnology (i.e., no model systems)."
- "Among the more specific research areas outlined in points 4-9, point 8 is particularly weak. As written, it
is not clear what value this point has to either basic science or to risk assessment and I would recommend
eliminating it altogether."
- "Sounds like a fishing expedition here; what's the point? Our pathogens aren't pathogenic enough? this like
Objective 6. One suspects that it is code for something more specific, that should be spelled out here."
- "I do not feel this is worth much effort -- of course, genes that enhance virulence exist -- but so what? I do
not see where this research effort will lead us to what is practically useful."
- "Research area eight is about as vague and unfocused as possible; any gene, any pathogen, and animal. At
least the previous version identified organisms of interest to APHIS, again presumably because these
pathogens are currently being engineered for vaccine production or other uses. There seems to be less outside
input into potential risks in animals systems as opposed to plant systems. Considerable thought needs to be
given to what types of research proposals are needed in this area."
- "Do such genes exist? Have there been any applications in this group?"
- "I do not understand why objective eight...is a priority. This may reflect poor understanding on my part --
I have little scientific training with warm blooded vertebrates. Nevertheless, at the very least, more context
for this objective would be helpful!"
- "My view of virulence and pathogenicity in both animals and plants is that the fields are too immature to
make any sensible projections of practical work ('identification of genes which can confer additional
pathogenicity...') worthwhile."
b.
Expert Panel's comments
The Expert Panel considered the criticisms of objective 8 to be valid and concluded that it should not be continued
in its current form.
9.
Objective #9.
Environmental risk analysis of large scale deployment of genetically engineered
organisms; especially commercial uses of such organisms with special reference to consideration
that may not be revealed through small scale evaluations and tests."
a.
Reviewers' comments
Conceptually, reviews of this Program area were, for the most part, favorable. With the exception of a few comments
about the need for clarifying examples, the comments were supportive.
- "...I would like to see an emphasis on experiments in Category 9. I feel we need this information, which is
the ultimate in risk assessment."
- "Research targeted under area 9 is absolutely essential for fostering environmentally safe commercialization
of agricultural biotechnology. A salient example of an important problem is scaling up of production of crops
expressing Bt endotoxin from the experimental stage (where plant pests encounter this pesticide only rarely)
to the commercial scale (where widespread use would cause sufficient selective pressure for resistance that
Bt's future as an effective pesticide would prove limited). Other risk mechanisms involving other products
of agricultural biotechnology also might become important only at the landscape scale. Results of studies
supported under this research area could prove critically important for strategic development of agricultural
biotechnology, in terms of realizing its potential while minimizing negative environmental impacts."
Some reviewers offered suggestions for clarification of the objective:
- "Research area nine was introduced in the solicitation for the 1995 Program. It would have helped my
understanding if a 'for example' was provided, but perhaps the originators were leaving it to the applicants
to make the case. If so, hopefully there have been submissions that may help the Program administrators to
phrase the statement in such a way as to be able to hone in on the subject."
- An additional comment about the need for more clarity was offered by the reviewer who wrote, "The
objective is very vague. The objective asks for an environmental risk analysis of large scale deployment of
genetically engineered organisms. It seems obvious that this objective was written with some circumstance
in mind; it would have been better to share that circumstance as an example for potential respondents."
- One reviewer, in support of the objective, offered the following suggestions about criteria for research design
and subsequent proposal review: "Large-scale risk assessment should assume both the probability that the
gene will migrate into domestic and weedy relatives and, secondly, impact when the gene or genes are
transmitted to domestic or weedy relatives. The function of the gene can then be considered as the primary
criterion of risk assessment. A gene that modifies seed oil characteristics will likely have different impact
on weedy and domestic relatives than herbicide resistance, insect resistance, male sterility, or disease
resistance. Large-scale deployment of single transgene resistance to a single insect or disease pest will alter
the occurrence of other disease and/or insect pathogens that occur. Market penetrations may change the
pattern of diseases or insects if safeguards are not taken. Normally, competition in the marketplace is the
preferred safeguard since alternative sources of resistance, both transgenic and nontransgenic, will arise for
the most significant pests. Consideration should be given to evaluation of source of transgenes and the
genetic background of the plants in which the transgene is deployed. Genetic variation for both factors will
minimize risk of new insect and/or disease pest becoming dominant, and also minimize development of
resistance a transgene (i.e., Bt loss of effectiveness).
Consideration might also be given to determining how long negative effects might persist once a transgene
is no longer used commercially. Would transgenes that have migrated into domesticated and weedy relatives
disappear rapidly after large scale use is curtailed?
The use of appropriate statistical models, experimental designs, and use of appropriate statistical consultants
are very important criteria that should be used to evaluate all proposals. Appropriate statistical treatment of
data will be necessary to predict the impact of one study for similar transgenes or species."
There was, however, some ambivalence expressed about this objective as exemplified by the following comments:
- "I am a little concerned about the purpose of the 9th area of research to be supported. The risks of large scale
releases should and could be addressed in the first two areas of research mentioned in the Announcement.
While I support obtaining data from large scale field releases, mentioning this area of research as a separate
topic may serve to debase the small scale studies that have been done, and unduly heighten the concern of
large scale releases."
- Consistent with the opinion expressed above was the conclusion that, "All risk analysis should be aimed at
large-scale commercial use of transgenic organisms. Hence, this effort does not need an extra item. I suppose
the point here is that data from small, short-term field trials cannot address some concerns that emerge when
we go ahead on commercialization. In that event, certainly we need to worry about those phenomena that
emerge only after commercialization (such as the evolution of insect resistance to Bt endotoxin)."
- Of interest are the comments of the reviewer who suggested that this Program area be reduced, not because
of the lack of a need for information derived from large-scale uses, i.e., introduction of transgenic plants into
large acreage commercial applications, but because "It would appear to me that this effort will now become
a component of normal agricultural extension activities at the state level. The USDA should implement
mechanisms to insure the assignment of this responsibility, thereby decreasing item 9..."
- One criticism of this objective was voiced within the context of limited funds: "Although this has an
admirable sound to it, such projects are scarcely feasible with the restricted program budget."
- In questioning the ability of this Program to achieve its stated goals one reviewer offered a valuable
suggestion: "How realistic it will be to compare small and large scale releases of GMOs in projects
funded by this program is doubtful since nothing that could be attempted here could match the large
commercial release covering millions of acres. In my view, this is best done through comparing the
records of previous releases of conventional organisms and GMOs."
- The need for collaboration with commercial interests who are active in this areas was reinforced by the
reviewer who suggested "...perhaps the most appropriate use of the resources is to work with the
providers of the materials, monitoring populations of pests and pathogens, as well as non-target
organisms. It is also important to provide support not only for study of macro-organisms (animals, plants,
etc.) but also for modified microorganisms. It is anticipated that modified soil and foliar organisms,
including Rhizobitan spp., micorhizal fungi, and other beneficial organisms, as well as microbes that
provide biological control of pests and pathogens will soon be ready for the market. Given the history of the
early Lindow experiments, those of Brill, Cook, and numerous private companies, and the public perception
of microbes as involved in disease, such studies are important to the industry associated with agricultural
biotechnology."
b.
Expert Panel's comments
The Expert Panel recognized that because of limitations in funding and amount of resources required to conduct such
large scale studies as called for in this objective, more creative approaches are needed to accomplish its worthy goals.
The Expert Panel suggested that efforts be made to create effective lines of communication leading to collaboration
between commercial enterprises, who have the resources to conduct such studies, and scientists who could design
experiments that would successfully examine the risk. The Expert Panel stressed that the endpoints/consequences
(e.g., effects of gene transfer, impact on non-target organisms, impact on the ecology, changes in pathogenicity and
host range, creation of new pathogens, resistance management, etc.) to be evaluated in such studies be well-defined
and focused on the overriding programmatic goal of identification of gaps in knowledge related to regulation of risk.